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000O000 
REPLY BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Appellant is appealing from an Amended Decree of 
Divorce (hereafter called "THE DECREE") prepared by Plaintiff's 
counsel, which the Fourth District Court ordered entered into 
the Court record as of April 20, 1984. (See August 20th Minute 
Entry, record page 126.) The trial Court ordered Plaintiff's 
counsel to prepare "THE DECREE" after the trial Court concluded 
that the previously prepared "Order Modifying Decree" and 
the proposed "Amended Decree Nunc Pro Tunc", both prepared 
by Defendant/Appellant's counsel, did not accurately reflect 
the stipulation of the parties as said stipulation was stated 
to the Court by Defendant/Appellant's counsel on April 4, 
1983 (see transcript of April 4, 1983 "Stipulation and Hearing", 
record pp. 154-157 and see "Rulings" of the Court dated February 
6, 1984 and June 19, 1984, record pages 84 and 106). The 
"Order Modifying Decree" dated May 2, 1983 (approximately 
one year after the original decree was entered) prepared by 
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Defendant/Appe1lant's counsel provided language amending 
retroactively for one (1) year the child support amount of 
Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00), set forth in the original 
Decree, and provided language concerning visitation rights 
inconsistent with the original Decree of pivorce and the oral 
and written stipulations of the parties. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The original Decree of Divorce was entered in the lower 
Court on May 4, 1982. That Decree provided in the first of 
two paragraphs styled "5" that the Plaintiff was to have custody 
and the Defendant had the right of reasonable visitation. 
The second paragraph styled "5" provided for restricted visitation 
of the Defendant only in the presence of specified parties (R. 15). 
Prior to the end of 1982, Defendant motioned the trial 
Court to set aside the Decree of Divorce, which motion was 
granted by the Court in the Ruling on December 20, 1982 (record, 
p. 28 ). The matter was set for trial on April 4, 1983 at 
which time counsel for the respective parties (ANDREW MCCULLOUGH 
for the Defendant/Appellant and RICHARD HILL for the Plaintiff/ 
Respondent) appeared before the Court and entered into a 
stipulation providing for the reinstatement of all of the para-
graphs and provisions of the original Decree of Divorce (including 
implicitly both paragraphs styled "5") except for paragraph 
"7" and paragraph "8". (Record, p. 154-155) No finding of 
fact was made by the Court that there was any good cause for 
implementing the stipulation stated to the Court "Nunc Pro Tunc". 
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Nothing was contained in the stipulation stated by counsel to 
the Court on that date that the stipulation was intended to 
or that the parties had agreed that the stipulation be imple-
mented "Nunc Pro Tunc". Based upon that stipulation the Court 
ruled from the bench as follows: "The Court will now make 
an Order striking the Court's Ruling [the Ruling setting aside 
the original Decree of Divorce] and striking your answer and 
counterclaim." (Record lines 11-13 p. 154 ) At the end of 
the hearing the Court stated further "Alright. The Court 
will approve the stipulation. The Court will be in recess 
on this matter." (Record lines 11 and 12, p. 156 ) The parties 
were not present at that stipulation hearing on April 4, 1983. 
On or about May 2, 1983 the Defendant, Appellent's counsel 
submitted to the Court and "Order Modifying Decree". The 
written order as submitted to the Court Wcis consistent with 
the oral stipulation in providing for the reinstatement of 
the original Decree except for paragraphs 7 and 8. However 
the written order was significantly different than the oral 
stipulation made to the Court in the language used to describe 
the terms of visitation. 
Thereafter, Attorney Hill withdrew from the case and 
Attorney Arron F. Jepson appeared for the Plaintiff/Respondent. 
Plaintiff/Respondent's new counsel motioned the Coijrt on or 
about September 22, 1983 for a clarification of inconsistencies 
which the Plaintiff saw between the oral stipulation, the 
'Order Modifying Decree" and the original Decree of Divorce 
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with respect to visitation terms. (R.41) Plaintiff also requested 
that an evidenciary hearing be held during which both parties 
could present evidence bearing on the issue of visitation 
and ask the trial Court to base a decision clarifying the 
visitation upon said evidence. (R.41) Simultaneous with the filing 
of the Plaintiff/Respondent•s motion the Defendant/Appellant 
filed a motion for relief from judgment claiming a clerical 
mistake and asking the Court to simply strike paragraph 5 
of the original Decree (without making reference to which 
paragraph 5 was intended) and alleging that such relief would 
solve all of the problems of inconsistent language. (R.p. 56 ) 
The Defendant/Appellant urged the trial Court to deny the Plain-
tiff/Respondent's request for an evidentiary hearing. 
(R. lines 22-23 p. 60) 
The trial Court denied the Plaintiff/Respondentfs motion for 
clarification and for an evidentiary hearing. (R. 84) The trial Court 
granted the Defendant/Appellant's motion to correct a clerical 
mistake and struck paragraph 5 from the original Decree 
of Divorce. Defendant/Appellant's counsel prepared an "Amended 
Decree Nunc Pro Tunc" and submitted the same to the Court. 
Plaintiff/Respondent's counsel objected tp the proposed order. 
Two hearings were held, one on March 16, 1984 and another 
on April 20, 1984, during which arguments of counsel were 
heard by the Court concerning the proposed Amended Decree 
of Divorce and the objections filed by Plaintiff/Respondentfs 
counsel. (Record see pp. 90 , 97 , and 100 ) On June 
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19, 1984 the Court made its Ruling concerning the proposed 
order and the objections thereto and ordered Plaintiff/Respondent's 
counsel to prepare an amended decree of divorce- Plaintiff/ 
Respondent's counsel prepared an amended decree of divorce 
which decree of divorce was entered and signed by the Court 
on the 20th day of August, 1984, and from which the Appellant 
now appeals. (R. pp. 10 6 and 10 7 ) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff/Respondent seeks the Supreme Court's affirmation 
of the final Amended Decree of Divorce as entered by the trial 
Court on August 20, 1984. Plaintiff/Respondents also seeks 
a ruling denying Appellant's claim for two (2) changes in 
form in the final Amended Decree of Divorce which seeks first 
to alter the visitation and secondly seeks to reduce the first 
year's child support amount (from the date of the original 
decree May 4, 1982 through May 2, 1983) from Two Hundred Fifty 
Dollars ($250.00) per month as originally ordered by the trial 
Court to One Hundred Fifty Dollars ($150.00) per month, a 
total of Twelve Hundred Dollars ($1200.00). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts in this case revolve primarily 
around the procedural issues which were raised in the lower 
court and around the disposition as outlined in this brief 
in the section entitled "Disposition in the Lower Court". 
Part of the argument in the lower court between the parties 
involved the issue whether their was ever a stipulation agreed 
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upon by the parties. There are two (2) affidavits in this 
file which were filed with the lower court. One (1) affidavit 
from Mr. Hill claiming that the Plaintiff agreed to the stipu-
lation as stated to the Court on April 4, 1983 and another 
affidavit from the Plaintiff which claimed that she did not 
agree to that stipulation and did not authorize Mr. Hill to enter 
into that stipulation. (R. 65, 49) The low0r court ruled that the 
stipulation as stated to the Court on April 4, 1983 was in 
fact the stipulation of the parties and that the Plaintiff 
was bound by Mr. Hill's representation to the trial Court 
that his client had authorized him to entter into the stipu-
lation. That stipulation was stated to the Court by the De-
fendant/Appellant's counsel with regard to the issue of visita-
tion as follows: 
"Mr. Midgley will receive three (3) weeks 
visitation with the minor child to be non-
consecutive. The exact times and dates to 
be worked out between the parties. And that 
each year hereafter, until it reaches a 
maximum of six (6) weeks, that |vould increase 
the total visitation would increase by 
one (1) week. So this year thrbe (3) weeks, 
next year four (4) weeks, and so on until it 
gets to six (6). The exact timps and places 
to be worked out between the parties." 
"And once the six (6) weeks gbes into effect, 
the parties will divide the costs of transport-
ing the child back and forth, because the 
child will then be old enough to travel on 
his own." (R. lines 3-14, p. ) 
This language is the stipulation which the trial Court 
found to be the stipulation of the parties. (R. see transcript 
of hearing dated March 16, 1984, R. pp. 1^1-170, and lines 
13-18 on p. 170 ) 
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When the Defendant/Appellant's counsel prepared the "Order 
Modifying Decree" he put in the following language: 
2a. Defendant is hereby granted reasonable 
visitation rights with his minor son, to in-
clude at least three (3) weeks during the 
year 1983, the increase to four (4) weeks dur-
ing 1984, five (5) weeks during 1985, and 
six (6) weeks during 1986 and subsequent 
years. The three (3) weeks of visitation dur-
ing 1983 shall be non-consecutive, due to the 
age of the minor child. 
2b. Commencing in 1986, when the child is 
old enough to travel on his own, Plaintiff 
and Defendant shall equally split the costs 
of transporting the child between the parties 
for visitation. Until then, Defendant shall 
be responsible for picking up and delivering 
the child for visitation. Defendant Shall 
give Plaintiff one (1) week's notice before 
exercising his right or visitation. (Record 
pp. 33 -35 ) 
The statement of facts as contained herein together with 
the statement of the disposition in the lower court as contained 
in this brief together with the statement of facts as contained 
in the appellant's brief sets forth substantially the facts 
of this case. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The issues raised by the Defendant/Appellant in this 
appeal are as follows: 
1. Whether the "Order Modifying Decree" dated May 2, 
1983 (drafted by Appellant's counsel), was, in part, an invalid 
Nunc Pro Tunc order making an order "now" (May 2, 1983) for 
"then" (oral stipulation and oral order of the Court of April 
4, 1983), which altered the Court's previous order and constitu-
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ted a substantial departure from the earlier announcement 
and did not merely reflect the previous ruling of the Court 
concerning child suppott and visitation, where the original 
April 4, 1983 oral order of the Court contained no such "Nunc 
Pro Tunc" language and no finding of good cause was made by 
the Court as required by Section 30-4a-l, U.C.A., 1953 as 
amended in 1983. 
2. Whether the trial Court properly corrected itself 
(its previous rulings) by making two (2) changes in the May 
2, 1983 "Order Modifying Decree:" (a) striking therefrom the 
"Nunc Pro Tunc" language concerning child support and visita-
tion, and (b) ordering the drafting of new visitation language, 
both of which changes properly reflect th£ original Oral Order 
of the Court and the original Oral Stipulation of the parties 
dated April 4, 1983, in the form of an Antended Decree of Divorce 
(drafted by Plaintiff/Respondent's counsel). 
3. Whether it is proper for the Appellant to request 
Nunc Pro Tunc relief on appeal which wouW require the Supreme 
Court to find facts contrary to those found by the trial Court 
with respect to the trial Court's interpretation of its own 
original Oral Order at the April 4, 1983 stipulation hearing, 
which interpretation is embodied in the ^inal Amended Decree 
of Divorce from which the Appellant takes this appeal. 
4. Can the Appellant properly request an order from 
the Supreme Court of Utah granting an evidentiary hearing 
after the Appellant successfully objected to the Respondent's 
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request for an evidentiary hearing at the trial Court level, 
concerning the issues of visitation and child support, especially 
where no allegation of error has been made and no issue raised 
on appeal regarding the trial Court's ruling in Appellant's 
favor denying evidentiary hearing. 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES AND ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPELLANT'S "ORDER MODIFYING DECREE" AND THE RESPONDENT'S 
FINAL "AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE" SHOULD EACH BE COMPARED TO 
THE ORIGINAL ORAL STIPULATION AND THE ORIGINAL ORAL ORDER OF 
THE TRIAL COURT FOR ACCURACY, RATHER THAN BEING COMPARED TO 
EACH OTHER AS THE APPELLANT HAS DONE (WITH RESPECT ONLY TO THE 
ISSUES OF VISITATION AND REDUCED CHILD SUPPORT). 
There was a disagreement at the trial Court level concern-
ing whether there was ever a stipulation at all between the 
parties. That issue however has not been raised on appeal. 
It was this argument at the trial Court level which caused 
the trial Court to determine that there not only had been 
a stipulation entered into between the parties with regard 
to visitation and child support, but also that the stipulation 
entered into was that stipulation orally stated to the Court 
on April 4, 1983, at which time the Court ordered that that 
stipulation be approved (Record, paragraphs 1 and 2, p. 85; 
lines 11-12, p. 156; lines 13-21, p. 170). The trial Court 
therefore made a specific finding of fact that there was a 
stipulation as to visitation and child support, that that 
stipulation was the Oral Stipulation stated to the Court on 
April 4, 1983, and that it was that stipulation which should 
-9-
correctly be reflected in the final "Amended Decree of Divorce" 
from which the Appellant appeals. However/ the issue whether 
their was a stipulation and what the stipulation was as found 
by the trial Court, has not been raised iti this appeal. There-
fore both parties are bound by the trial Court's finding of 
fact as to what constituted the parties' stipulation, and 
what the trial Court's order was pursuant thereto. 
The Appellant wants the trial Court to compare the two 
(2) written documents (the "Order Modifying Decree" prepared 
by the Appellant's attorney and the "Amended Decree of Divorce" 
prepared by Respondent's attorney) rather than comparing each 
of those documents to the April 4, 1983 Otral Stipulation of 
the parties and Oral Order of the Court. 
POINT II 
HOW SHOULD THE FIRST ISSUE, STATED ABOVE, BE ANSWERED? 
The answer should be that the "Order Modifying Decree" 
dated May 2, 1983 and prepared by Appellant is, in part, an 
invalid "Nunc Pro Tunc" order. After carbful comparison of 
that order with the original Oral Stipulation and Oral Order 
of the trial Court, it is clear that there was no discussion 
on April 4, 1984 either between counsel or with the Court 
that indicated that the stipulation was to be implemented 
retroactively. There is also no "finding of good cause" by 
the trial Court that a Nunc Pro Tunc order should enter, which 
finding is required by Section 30-4a-l, d.C.A., 1953 as 
amended in 1983. The obvious intention of the parties was to 
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effectuate a reduction in the child support for the months 
following the April 4, 19 83 stipulation. That means in simple 
terms, that the original Decree of Divorce provision granting 
Two Hundred Fifty-Dollars ($250.00) per month to the Plaintiff 
as child support had accrued each month from the date of entry 
of the original Decree until April 4, 1983, the twelth month. 
This Court has announced in its March 18, 1977 decision in 
the case of Larsen vs. Larsen, 561 P. 2d. 10 77 that: 
"In this jurisdiction alimony and support pay-
ments become unalterable as they accrue; there-
fore, periodic installments cannot be changed or 
modified after the installments have become due." 
The Larsen case, supra, denied the state's attempt to retro-
actively modify support payments which had accrued in a period 
of time in the past. Although the attempt in the Larsen case 
was to increase the child support retroactively, and the attempt 
by the Appellant in this case is to decrease the child support 
retroactively, the principle of law is identicle. In its 
May 1, 1984 decision in the case of Preece vs. Preece, 682 P. 2nd. 
298 (Utah 1984) this Supreme Court interpreted Section 30-4a-l 
of the Utah Code Annotated. The Preece case announced the doctrine 
that : 
"A nunc pro tunc order should be the reflec-
tion of a previously made ruling. The Court 
had orally announced that the decree was "to 
become final upon signing." By making it 
effective as of the trial date rather than upon 
signing, the Court altered its previous ruling. 
It did not merely reflect its previous ruling. 
Even though it did not otherwise deviate from 
its oral announcement, this alteration of the 
effective date was nonetheless a substantial 
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departure from the earlier announcement. Nunc 
pro tunc should not be used in (that circumstance, 
(emphasis added) Preece, supra, at 300. 
It is this very section 30-4a-l U.C.IA. upon which the 
Appellant relies for support of its claim on appeal that Appel-
lant's use of the nunc pro tunc language in its "Order Modify-
ing Decree" is justified. This is cleanly contrary to the 
ruling of this Court in the Preece case and contrary to public 
policy. Because of the pressures upon the trial Court and 
the trial Court's reliance upon adversarial attorneys as officers 
of the Court in drafting written orders Which properly reflect 
the rulings of the Court, it would certainly be against public 
policy to sanction the position urged upon this honorable 
Court by the Appellant. By the stroke of a pen (the Appellant's 
counsel's typewriter in this case) an Oral Stipulation of 
the parties through their counsel, which was approved by order 
of the trial Court, was miraculousy and suddenly transformed 
into a retroactive order, contrary to the Oral Stipulation. 
The transformed order (Order Modifying Decree) suddently reached 
back in time twelve (12) months and deprived the Plaintiff/ 
Respondent of eleven or twelve hundred dollars in child support 
payments which had already accrued but which had not yet been 
paid. 
In short, "the function of a nunc pro tunc order is not 
to make an order now for then, but to en1(:er now for then an 
order previously made". Preece vs. Preece, 682 P. 2d. 298 
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(Utah 1984) , at 299. The previously made order of the trial 
Court was the Oral Order of the Court entered at the April 
4, 1983 hearing after listening to the Oral Stipulation of 
the parties through their counsel. It contained no nunc pro 
tunc language. 
A careful examination of the Oral Stipulation language 
(Record, lines 24-25, p. 154 and lines 3-8, p. 155) reveal 
that the agreement as to visitation was that the visitation 
be "nonconsecutive". On line 7 of page 155 of the record 
MR. MCCULLOUGH stated to the Court "that would increase the 
total visitation would increase by one (1) week.". The refer-
ences clearly to the three (3) weeks of non-consecutive visita-
tion, which would increase by one (1) week thereafter through 
1986. Contrary to the express language of the Oral Stipulation, 
the Appellant's "Order Modifying Decree", dated May 2, 1983, 
says what the Court did not say. The Court approved the Oral 
Stipulation as it was stated and as shown in the record pre-
viously referred to. The written order states that there 
would be increasing amounts of visitation each year through 
1986, but changes the nonconsecutive language of the Oral 
Stipulation and limits the nonconsecutive language to the 
first (1) year, 1983. This was>not the language which was 
approved and ordered by the Court on April 4, 1983. This 
Court has declared in Preece, supra: 
"A motion nunc pro tunc is used to make the 
records speak the truth; it may not be used to 
correct the Court's failure to speak." 
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The Court did not change the nonconsecutive language 
of the Oral Stipulation. It was only the Appellant's Order 
which changed nonconsecutive visitation tt> consecutive visita-
tion , after the fact, through use of a mint pro tunc order. 
POINT III 
HOW SHOULD ISSUE NUMBER II, SET FORTH ABOVE, BE DECIDED? 
The answer is yes. The trial Court properly acted in strik-
ing the nunc pro tunc language from the M&y 2, 1983 "Order 
Modifying Decree". The Court also acted properly in ordering 
the drafting of hew visitation language td comport with thfe 
express language of the Oral Stipulation of the parties as 
adopted by the Order of the trial Court oin April 4, 1983. 
(See generally Preece, supra) 
The authority cited by the Appellant in the case of Sears 
vs. Riemersma/ 655 P. 2d. 1105 is not the controlling authority 
in this case. This is not a case where the Court is seeking 
to interpret a contract. The issues on appeal are not what 
the contract or stipulation was between the parties. The 
trial Court made a finding as to what the stipulation was, 
its terms, and when it was made. That isisue has not been 
raised in this appeal. The other cases cited by the Appellant 
(DuBois vs. Nye, 584 P. 2d. 823 (Utah 1918); Nixon and Nixon, 
Inc. vs. John New and Associates, 641 P. £d. 144 (Utah 1982); 
and Sears vs. Riemersma, 655 P. 2d. 1105 U^tah 1982) supra) 
are not applicable or controlling in this appeal. The trial 
Court in making changes and amendments tq the original 
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Decree of Divorce, and the "Order Modifying Decree" attempted 
to conform the Court's rulings and orders with the Oral Stipu-
lation of the parties as the trial Court found that stipulation 
to be, and as the trial Court ordered it adopted. The parties 
are therefore bound by that finding of fact by the trial Court. 
First of Denver Mortg. Investors vs. C. N. Zundel, 600 
P. 2d. 521, at 527, is the case in which this Supreme Court 
on August 24, 1979 stated: 
"Parties are bound by their stipulations 
unless relieved therefrom by the Court, 
which has the power to set aside a stipula-
tion entered into inadvertently or for 
justifiable cause." 
The trial Court in this case has not relieved the parties 
from their stipulation but has in fact stated unequivocably 
that the parties are bound by the April 4, 1983 Oral Stipulation. 
There has been no claim that there has been a mistake of 
fact* raised as an issue in this appeal. Therefore the parties 
are bound by the trial Court's finding of fact and the Appellant 
cannot claim relief against a stipulation, found as a fact 
by the trial Court. (See United Factors vs. T. C. Associates, 
Inc., 445 P. 2d. 766, at 769) 
POINT IV 
HOW SHOULD ISSUES XII and IV, STATED HEREINABOVE, BE DECIDED? 
In order to grant the "nunc pro tunc" relief requested 
by the Appellant in this appeal, the appellate Court would 
have to substitute its fact finding judgment for that of the 
trial Court with respect to the trial Court's interpretation 
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of its own original Oral Order adopting the Oral Stipulation 
of the parties as stated to the Court on the 4th day of April, 
1983. (Record, pp. 154-155, and 156) It is well settled law never-
theless that unless the trial Court clearly abuses its discretion, 
the appellate Court will not substitute its judgment for that 
of the trial Court's. As stated previously in this brief, 
the Plaintiff/Respondent vigorously motioned the trial Court 
to hold an evidentiary hearing allowing both parties to present 
evidence with respect to the child support issue and the visita-
tion issues raised in this appeal. The Plaintiff/Appellant 
vigorously opposed the Respondent's reque$t for an evidentiary 
hearing and urged the Court to deny such a request and to 
refuse to hold an evidentiary hearing. ($ee Record, p. 41, 
first paragraph on page 45, points 2 and 3, pp. 46-47, and 
lines 22 and 23, p. 60, paragraph 7, p. 711, paragraphs 3, 
4, 5, 6, and 7, pp. 73-75, and the last sentence on page 84) 
The principles of equity and fair play should estop the 
Apellant from receiving relief on appeal in the form of an 
order granting him an evidentiary hearing, when the Appellant 
at the trial Court level could have had an evidentiary hearing 
and could have presented any and all evidence he desired at 
that hearing respecting child support and visitation, but 
vigorously and successfully resisted such relief and opportunity, 
apparently because it was requested by the Plaintiff/Respondent. 
In other words, the Appellant at the trial Court level wanted 
a decision from the trial judge based only upon the Court records 
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and successfully resisted the Court holding an evidentiary 
hearing. After the trial Court entered its final decision 
based upon the record, including the Stipulation of the parties 
as the trial Court found it to be, the Appellant now seeks 
an evidentiary hearing in an effort to reverse the trial Court's 
judgment based upon the record. This position of the Appellant 
is clearly contrary to law and is without merit. An analogous 
situation arose in the case of Minshew vs. Chevron Oil Company, 
575 P. 2d. 192, at 193, wherein this Supreme Court declared: 
"This contention is without merit for when 
a factual matter is submitted for decision on 
the record, without objection, the parties are 
bound by the record and on the view this Court 
is compelled to defer to the judgment of the 
trial Court if there is substantial confident, 
admissable evidence in that record to support 
it." 
At the time of the original stipulation herein, April 
4, 1983, the Defendant/Appellant failed to request that the 
reduction in child support be made retroactive one (1) year 
to the date of the original decree and also failed to provide 
in the stipulation that the nonconsecutive visitation provision 
change at some future point to be consecutive visitation weeks. 
The failure of the Appellant to reserve those issues at that 
point in time is res judicata. (See Amos vs. Bennion, 517 
P. 2d. 1008 at 1009) 
The Appellant had his day in Court at the trial Court 
level. He could have had an evidentiary hearing and could 
have clearly set forth consecutive visitation, assuming the 
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Plaintiff/Respondent had agreed, and the Appellant further 
could have set forth in the Oral Stipulation that the re-
duction in child support was to be retroactive, however the 
Appellant failed to do so. Since the Appellant failed to 
raise those points and the trial level, and affirmatively 
resisted the evidentiary hearing at the trial level, the 
Appellant cannot now gain such relief at the appelate Court 
level. (See in the matter of the Estate of Andrew Ekker, 
432 P. 2d. 45, at 46; and Meyer vs. Deluke, 457 P. 2d. 966, 
at 968) 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the two (2) specific areas of modification 
in the final "Amended Decree of Divorce" entered by the trial 
Court on April 20, 1984 as requested by Appellant should be 
denied. Costs and attorneys fees should be awarded to the 
Plaintiff/Respondent. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 15th day of February, 1985. 
ARJfoN F." JEPSOlW 
Attorney for PLacint iff/Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I here by certify that I mailed or personally delivered 
two true and correct copies of the foregoing "Respondent's 
Brief", postage pre-paid, to W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH, attorney for 
Appellant, 930 South State Street Suite 10, Orem, UT 84057, 
this 15th day of February, 1985. 
